Verify a Due Diligence statement

A due-diligence statement carries two independent signatures. This page re-checks both, plus the provider's append-only log. Everything below marked here is computed on this server with no outside call, and the same code runs in eudr verify on your own machine. One check still asks emem, and it says so.

1. Engine receipt (the Annex II statement, signed by eudr.dev) — here: re-canonicalises the payload, re-derives the CIDv1 (raw codec, BLAKE3-256) and compares to cid, then verifies the ed25519 signature in signature_b64 against signer.pubkey_b32. Also available offline: eudr verify path/to/receipt.json.
2. Transparency-log anchor (the tree head emem signed, pinned into your document) — here: verifies its ed25519 signature against emem's pinned key, then folds every inclusion proof the receipt carries to that head's root. Checking a signature against the key carried in the same document proves only that the document agrees with itself; the pinned key is one a person approved. Pin the tree_size and later prove emem only appended with /v1/log/consistency.
3. Earth-observation provider receipt (the satellite facts, signed by emem.dev under a different key) — at emem: pulled from source_receipts.emem.signed_receipt and re-checked at emem's own verifier. Its preimage is BLAKE3 over canonical CBOR of emem's own structures, and a second implementation of someone else's serialiser that was subtly wrong would call a good receipt forged — so this one is not re-derived here. It is the one check that asks the signer about its own signature, and it is worth exactly what that is worth.

Individual fact CIDs dereference at https://emem.dev/v1/facts/<fact_cid>.