Verify a Due Diligence statement

eudr.dev register · two signature chains + append-only log · checkable without trusting us
What this checks & how

A due-diligence statement carries two independent signatures. This page re-checks both, plus the provider's append-only log — nothing here asks you to trust eudr.dev.

  1. Engine receipt (the Annex II statement, signed by eudr.dev): re-canonicalises the payload, re-derives the CIDv1 (raw codec, BLAKE3-256) and compares to cid, then verifies the ed25519 signature in signature_b64 against signer.pubkey_b32. Also available offline: eudr verify path/to/receipt.json.
  2. Earth-observation provider receipt (the satellite facts, signed by emem.dev — a different key): pulled from source_receipts.emem.signed_receipt inside your document and re-checked at emem's own verifier, which re-derives the BLAKE3 preimage, checks the ed25519 signature, and validates the merkle inclusion proof.
  3. Transparency-log anchor: emem's current signed tree head (RFC 6962). Pin it, then later prove emem only appended to the log with /v1/log/consistency.

Individual fact CIDs dereference at https://emem.dev/v1/facts/<fact_cid>.

1 Engine receipt — the Annex II statement (eudr.dev key)

2 Earth-observation provider receipt (emem.dev key)

The satellite half, re-checked at emem's own verifier — a separate signature from the statement above.

3 Transparency-log anchor (append-only)

emem's current signed tree head. Pin the tree_size to later prove the log only grew.